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ABSTRAK
Makalah ini menelaah tentang struktur pasar industri benih jagung di Jawa 
Timur. Struktur pasar di tingkat produsen sangat oligopolistik yang mana volume 
penjualan didominasi oleh produk beberapa perusahaan multinasional berupa benih 
jagung hibrida. Pengemasan dan jenis varietas merupakan indikator utama diferensiasi 
produk. Semua produsen memperoleh informasi pasar secara memadai. Investasi yang 
cukup tinggi merupakan penghalang utama untuk masuk dan pangsa pasar yang sudah 
mapan merupakan faktor utama untuk meninggalkan industri ini. CR4 di tingkat pedagang 
menunjukkan bahwa pedagang besar-pengecer bersifat oligopolistik, tetapi pengecer 
relatif bersaing. Mendorong investor baru untuk masuk ke dalam industri benih 
merupakan pilihan kebijakan pemerintah yang bisa mengurangi konsentrasi produsen 
yang relatif tinggi dalam industri ini.
Kata kunci : struktur pasar, pangsa pasar, oligopoli, Jawa Timur
ABSTRACT
This study attempted to describe market structure of the corn seed industry in 
East Java. Market structure of the industry at the producer level was highly oligopolistic 
characterized by dominant volume of sales of few multinationals through their hybrid corn 
seed products. Packaging and types of varieties were the main indicators of product 
differentiation. All producers were well informed about the market. High capital 
investment was the main barrier to entry and established market share was the most 
important barrier to exit. CR4 at the traders’ level showed that the wholesaler-retailers 
were oligopolistic, but the retailers were relatively competitive. Encouraging new investors
to entry into the corn seed industry is the policy the government can take to reduce high 
concentration in this industry.
Key words : market structure, market share, oligopoly, East Java
INTRODUCTION
Background
The Government of Indonesia initiated an integrated seed production 
project during the first Five-Year Development Plan, i.e., 1969-1974. This project 
started with a campaign to boost the production and distribution of quality seeds 
of high-yielding varieties (HYV). The main activities of the campaign were as 
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follows: (1) rehabilitation and expansion of seed farms; (2) establishment of the 
National Seed Company (NSC), i.e., PT Sang Hyang Seri, to produce and 
distribute quality seeds; (3) establishment of the Seed Control and Certification 
Service (SCCS); (4) strengthening of the Food Crop Research Institute to 
produce quality breeder seeds and as a source of seed technology; (5) founding 
of the National Seed Board; and (6) planning and implementation of seed 
regulations. During the first two Five-year Development Plans (1969-1974 and 
1974-1979), the Indonesian government prioritized production and distribution of 
rice seeds to maintain rice production as the staple food. Since the third Five-
Year Development Plan (1979-1984), the government also paid attention to 
soybean and corn seed production due to increasing demand for livestock feeds 
(Soemartono, 1987). These government policies and programs encouraged the 
development of the domestic seed industry through the establishment of 
domestic and foreign private seed companies.
Market opportunities, especially for hybrid corn varieties, are still 
promising considering that there is a wide gap between corn seed production 
and demand. For example, hybrid corn seed used by Indonesian farmers in 
1996 was only 12.4 percent of the total corn seed requirement (Sulaiman et al., 
1998). In 2000, it was only about 15 percent of the total area planted to corn 
used hybrid corn varieties, unlike in the Philippines with 40 percent and in 
Thailand with 86 percent (CPAS, 2001). In 2004, the total area panted to hybrid 
corn varieties was 21 percent, but in the same year the total areas planted to 
hybrid corn varieties in Vietnam, Philippines, and Thailand were 35, 60, and 95 
percent, respectively (Mulya, 2004).    
Information on the market structure would be very useful in identifying 
the weaknesses of the corn seed industry in Indonesia. The problems of the 
industry can then be addressed by policy makers through setting of appropriate 
policies that would promote the Indonesia’s corn seed industry. 
Objectives
The major objective of this study was to analyze the market structure of 
the corn seed industry in East Java Province, Indonesia. Specifically, the 
objectives of the study were to assess (i) the degree of concentration of the seed 
producers and traders, (ii) product differentiation, (iii) market knowledge, and (iv) 
barriers to entry and exit.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Market structure is defined in terms of the organization of a market 
which seems to influence strategically the nature of competition and pricing 
within the market (Bain, 1968). Market structure of the corn seed industry has 
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some main elements, namely: (1) degree of buyer and seller concentration; (2) 
degree of product differentiation; (3) barriers to entry and exit; and (4) market 
knowledge. Market structure determines the behavior of a firm in the industry 
while market behavior, in turn, affects the industry's performance.
The degree of concentration refers to the ownership or control of a large 
proportion of some aggregate of economic resources or activity either by small 
proportion of the units which own or control the aggregate, or by small absolute 
number of such units. In this study, the interest is in the concentration of the 
control of the volume of corn seed production and sales at the seed 
companies'/producers' (both government-owned and private) level and in the 
concentration of the control of the volume of corn seed sales at the seed 
distributors' level.
Market share and profit rate is positively correlated such as shown in 
Figure 1. A firm with its market share less than 10 percent is said to have no 
market power. Market power emerges if it reaches 15 percent, and it gives a 
significant degree of monopoly when it is 25 to 30 percent (Sheperd, 1997). At 
market shares more than 40 to 50 percent, the market power is relatively strong.  
If the b slope is high, then market share is worthwhile and will be hunted for 
rigorously. Over time, market power of a firm may vary mainly with its market 
share. Concentration implies the degree of market power (Suvanichwong, 1997). 
Market power is ability of a firm to influence perceptibly the price and quantity in 
the market. It is also the firm's share of the industry's total sales revenue and it 
may vary from 0 to 100 percent. 
  Profit Rate (%)
     20
     10
Market Share (%)
        0       25                 50 75           
Figure 1.Basic Relationship between Market Share and Profitability (Adopted from 
Sheperd, 1997)
Cost of Capital
Net rate of return 
above the cost of 
capital
b
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Market entry is the addition of one or more new sellers to a market. Net 
entry is relevant to take into account because it reflects the difference between 
shares of entrants and the shares of firms that exited during a period. The speed 
of entry could occur very fast or very slowly. On the other hand, barriers against 
entry are situations that make entry difficult. There are two sources of barriers, 
i.e., exogenous and endogenous sources. Exogenous resources are found in 
the underlying market, such as capital requirements, economies of scale, 
absolute cost advantage, product differentiation, sunk costs, vertical integration, 
and formal, official barriers set by government agencies or industry-wide groups. 
Endogenous sources are conditions and strategies implemented by the 
dominant firms and may be voluntarily done, which consist of retaliation and 
preemptive actions, excess capacity, marketing expenses, market segmentation, 
legal barriers such as patents, controls over strategic resources, and secrecy 
(Sheperd, 1997).
The degree of product differentiation would determine if the buyers 
differentiate, distinguish, or have specific preferences among the competing 
outputs of the various sellers established in an industry (Suvanichwong, 1997). 
In the corn seed industry, corn seeds can be differentiated in terms of varying 
characteristics of different corn varieties, brands, and packaging. Product 
differentiation as a barrier can be observed in advertising and other seller 
activities which aim at intensifying the difference between a firm's product and 
the products of the competitors. 
On the other hand, absolute cost advantage of established firms is the 
ability of established firms to produce the products at a lower cost than the new 
firms because of skills of expert management personnel, control of the supply of 
raw materials, lower price of raw materials due to exclusive arrangement with 
suppliers or bulk-buying of the established firms, lower cost of capital, vertical 
integration or the production power of the established firms, patents, and 
superior technique available only to the established firms. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Data Collection
Primary data were gathered from the corn seed companies and corn 
seed distributors through personal interview using pre-tested questionnaires. 
Data gathered from the seed companies included the following information: year 
established, number of employees, capital investment, volume of corn seed 
production by variety, technology used in corn seed production, area planted to 
corn for seed production purposes, volume of corn seeds produced by variety 
and by season, production practices, and brand names of seeds sold. 
Secondary data were gathered from the related institutions. 
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Sampling Procedure
East Java Province was purposively selected as the study area because 
it is a major corn-growing area in Indonesia and has the biggest number of seed 
growers/companies and the second biggest distributors in the country. Complete 
enumeration was employed in the survey of corn seed companies and
distributors in East Java. The study was focused in the regencies of Jombang, 
Kediri, and Nganjuk. The study was conducted in 2002 and covered 3 
multinationals, 5 local companies (i.e., 1 government-owned and 4 privates), 32 
wholesaler-retailers (Jombang 7, Kediri 14, and Nganjuk 11), and 75 retailers 
(Jombang 14, Kediri 33, and Nganjuk 28). 
The corn seed producers chosen as samples of the study were Global-1 
(Kediri and Sidoarjo regencies), Global-2 (Surabaya municipality and Malang 
regency), Global-3 (Surabaya), Local-1 (Pasuruan and Malang regencies), 
Local-2  (Kediri regency), Local-3 (Malang regency), Local-4 (Jombang 
regency), and Local-5 (West-Sumatera based, its distributor in East Java). 
Market Structure Analysis 
The dimensions of market structure of the corn seed industry in three 
major corn-producing regencies in East Java, which were evaluated in this 
study, were degree of buyer and seller concentration, product differentiation, 
barriers to entry and exit, and market knowledge.
Degree of Concentration   
The number and distribution of seed companies/growers by type (i.e., 
local vs. foreign companies; government vs. private companies) and 
traders/distributors by type (i.e., wholesalers or retailers) were described. The 
degree of buyer and seller concentration at the traders’ level was assessed 
using concentration ratio of the biggest-four firms (CR4), Hirchman-Herfindahl 
Index, Entropy Index, and the Gini Ratio. At the corn seed producers’ level, the 
seller concentration ratio and the Gini Ratio based on the volume of sales of 
local corn seed producers and multinational seed companies were computed. 
Concentration Ratio (CR). This method is the most frequently used 
measure of concentration in an industry due to its simplicity. It is an easily 
understandable index of concentration. However, CR does not take into account 
different sizes in the largest firms and it just compares several large firms as a 
group with the rest of the firms in the industry. CR is formulated as 
CRm = 

m
i
iP
1
where:
138
Jurnal Agro Ekonomi, Volume 24 No.2,  Oktober 2006 : 133-156
CRm = concentration ratio of the m top seed producers or traders in the 
industry 
Pi    = total market shares of those m largest seed producers or traders 
expressed in percent. This was computed by dividing the total 
volume of corn seed sales of the biggest four producers or 
traders (seed distributors) by the total volume of seed sales of 
all producers/traders in the industry.
This study mainly computed CR4, i.e., concentration ratio of the biggest-
four seed producers and traders. The market is considered to be a highly 
concentrated one if the four-firm ratio (CR4) is at least 40 percent (Parker and 
Connor, 1979). 
Hirchman-Herfindahl Index (HHI).  This index was computed by 
getting the sum of the square of the market shares of all traders in the market. It 
is expressed as follows:
HHI =  
n
i
i n
cv
P
2
2 )(1
where:
HHI = Hirchman-Herfindahl Index
n  = total number of firms in the industry 
cv = the coefficient of variation of firm size
Pi was defined previously. 
The value of HHI ranges from 0 to 1 with larger values indicating greater 
concentration. When all firms are of equal size, HHI is equal to 1/n. When H = 0, 
it means that there are infinity firms in the industry or it is a competitive market. 
When HHI = 1, it is a monopolistic market. The value between 0 and 1 indicates 
an oligopsonistic market structure. This index is sensitive to the shares of the 
largest firms. It reflects the share of each firm in the industry. An advantage of 
HHI is that it can be used to measure changes in the market share because it 
takes into account all firms in the market.
Entropy Index (EI). The definition of this index is inversely related with 
those of the two other indices. High concentration in the industry is indicated by 
the low value of the index. EI was calculated as follows:
E = 
n
i
iP log 



iP
1
where:
EI = Entropy Index
Pi was defined previously.
139
MARKET STRUCTURE OF THE CORN SEED INDUSTRY IN EAST JAVA  Bambang Sayaka
This index is the most sensitive to firm numbers than any other indices. The 
strength of EI over HHI is that EI could be decomposed into within and between 
group components. It is useful when the industry consists of sub-industries.
Gini Coefficient (Gr). The Gini coefficient measures the departure of 
the Lorenz curve actually observed and the curve which would appear if all firms 
have equal market shares. When the Gini coefficient is zero, this implies that 
there is perfect equality of the firms’ market share. This is a characteristic of a 
purely competitive market. A value lower than 0.5 and close to zero would 
indicate high equality in corn seed production or sales distribution share or vice 
versa. The Gini coefficient was computed as follows:
 
000,10
)()( 11 iiii YXYX
Gr
      
where: 
Gr =  Gini coefficient in percent
Xi  =  cumulative percentage of market share in a given quintile group 
Yi  =  cumulative percentage of firms in a quintile group 
Both Xi and Yi was arranged from the highest to the smallest. 
Product Differentiation
At the seed growers’/seed companies’ level, product differentiation was 
assessed in terms of variety and genetic technology used (e.g., hybrid or 
genetically modified organism, GMO). The study also solicited the corn farmers’ 
opinion on the seeds that they purchased in terms of quality (i.e., germination 
rate and seed characteristics). Product differentiation was also determined 
based on brand names and varieties of corn seeds sold by the distributors. 
Market Knowledge
The seed companies’ and distributors’ market knowledge was assessed. 
Market information included the types and varieties of corn seeds preferred by 
corn companies/farmers, potential seed requirement by region, and the 
prevailing market price. Their sources of market information were also identified 
in this study and the frequency of accessing market information was determined.
Barriers to Entry and Exit
Barriers to entry and exit at the seed companies and the distributors’/
traders’ level were examined in this study. Barriers to entry in the corn seed 
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industry covered the following aspects: (1) economies of scale; (2) capital 
requirement; and (3) legal barriers such as license and patents.
Economies of scale was assessed by examining the cost structure of 
large and small-scale firms. The average cost of large firms (large seed traders) 
was compared with that of small firms (small seed traders) in order to determine 
whether or not economies of scale exists in the corn seed industry. The 
advantage of established seed firms over new entrants that supported 
economies of scale was evaluated in terms of technological innovation.  and 
Capital requirement at the seed companies’ and distributors’ level was examined 
according to the scale of operation and compared to the average investment of 
the industry. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Profiles of the Producers and the Traders
Global-1, Global-2, and Global-3 are multinational companies in which 
among their products are hybrid corn seeds. Those companies operate in the 
country through their subsidiaries. Domesticl-1 to Domestic-5 are local 
companies specialized in producing food-crops seeds including corn seed. 
Local-5 produces hybrid corn seed invented by its own company, while the other 
four local companies produce corn seed invented by the AARD and/or 
University.  
Most of corn seed businesses were established in the 1990’s. Some 
corn seed traders initially sold agricultural inputs before they began selling 
commercial corn seeds.  Before the 1980’s, most of the commercial corn seeds 
were produced and sold by Domestic-1 and other local producers. In the 1980’s, 
when the hybrid corn seed was introduced, the market for commercial corn 
seeds became attractive. The hybrid corn seed companies like Global-2 and 
Global-3 produced and sold their own products, while Domestic-1 promoted the 
hybrid seed of Cargill and AARD.
Corn seed traders in the province of East Java were characterized by 
small business with no retailer specializing in selling corn seeds. Only 15 
percent of the corn seed retailers registered with the SCCS East Java and the 
rest were unregistered compared to twenty (63%) registered wholesaler-
retailers. 
Foreign investors, on their own, were not involved in commercial corn 
seed distribution and retail. Only the domestic traders and seed producers 
perform the marketing function of selling their products directly to the 
government projects or to local traders.  Foreign firms enter into joint-venture 
agreements with domestic investors and established their own marketing 
companies by assigning one or two distributors in each regency. Besides 
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commercial corn seed, the traders also sold pesticides, chemical fertilizers, rice 
seeds, vegetable seeds and agricultural equipment, especially hand sprayers. 
This indicated that the main business of the corn seed traders was agricultural 
inputs.  
Seed retailers employed, on the average, a minimum of one and 
maximum of five persons. Wholesaler-retailers, on the other hand, had more 
employees ranging from one to 24 persons. The traders with only one employee 
were usually family-run businesses, managed by either the wife or husband, 
while their spouses worked elsewhere. 
Market Structure 
Basically, the corn seeds sold in the market were classified into certified 
and uncertified seeds. The certified seed consisted of the hybrid and composite 
varieties. Uncertified seeds, also called illegal seeds, are sold without labels and 
brand names. The local term for the illegal corn seed is putihan which means 
white seed, reflecting its original color without the chemical treatment. Legally 
sold seeds usually bore a reddish color resulting from its treatment with the 
fungicide Ridomil. The illegal seeds included hybrid varieties like those produced 
by Global-1 and Global-2. Hybrid corn seed dominated the volume of sales at 
both wholesaler-retailers’ and retailers’ levels (Table 1).  The illegal seeds made 
up 2 percent of the wholesalers-retailers’ volume of sales representing 1.9 
percent of the total value of sales  The low figure for the illegal seeds market 
could be a result of the traders’ apprehension to reveal the truth despite the 
absence or lack of government monitoring. Transactions on illegal seeds were 
conducted privately between the trader and the consumer.  
The volume of sales for the composite varieties consisting of Arjuna 
BISI, Surya, and Bisma accounted for 90.6 tons per year or 6.0 percent of the 
total volume of sales while the hybrid varieties’ volume of sales at the 
wholesaler-retailers’ level was more than 1,400 tons (92.0%).
At the retailer’s level, 384 tons of hybrid corn seed was sold 
representing 95 percent of the total sales. The composite corn seed’s volume of 
sales accounted for 90 tons (4%) while the illegal seeds sold as much as 5 tons 
(1%). The study found out that the Bisma variety, which was propagated by local 
producers, was found only at the wholesaler-retailers end and not at the 
retailers’ level. This indicated that the Bisma corn variety was directly purchased 
by farmers from them and no retailers stocked it because of the low demand for 
the seed.  Bisma’s volume of sales of 24 tons, which is less than 2 percent of the 
total demand at the wholesaler-retailers’ level, was lower than the demand for 
Arjuna BISI and Surya varieties. This also showed that the locally-produced corn 
variety faced a stiff competition in the market.
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Table 1. Volumes and Values of Corn Seed Sales by Season in East Java, 2002
               
A. Wholesaler-Retailers
Volume of Sales Value of Sales
Variety/ 
brand
Peak 
Season
(kg)
Off 
Season
(kg)
Whole 
Year
(kg)
Peak 
Season
(Rp’000)
Off Season
(Rp’000)
Whole Year
(Rp’000)
Illegal Seed
Bisi 750 20300 21050 6,000 202,400 208,400
Pioneer 0 10000 10000 0 160,000 160,000
Subtotal
(%)
31050
(2.04)
368,400
(1.23)
Composite
Arjuna Bisi 16985 17365 34350 104,173.125 108,183.125 212,356.25
Surya 16125 15785 31910 99,353.125 96,078.125 195,431.25
Bisma 11080 13270 24350 56,995 66,469 123,464
Subtotal
(%)
90610
(5.95)
531,251.5
(1.77)
Hybrid
Bisi 272415 136345 408760 5,125,145 2,395,727 7,520,872
Cargill 179090 102110 281200 34,36,712.5 1,941,400.75 5,378,113.25
Pioneer 395050 316390 711440 8,874,996.25 7,260,743.75 16,135,740
A-4 200 300 500 3,200 4,800 8,000
Subtotal
(%)
1401900
(92.01)
29,042,725.25
(97.00)
Total
891695
(58.53)
631865
(41.47)
1523560
(100.00)
17,706,575
(57.41)
12,235,801.75
(39.67)
29,942,376.75
(100.00)
B. Retailers
Illegal Seed
Bisi 3100 0 3100 24,800 0 24,800
Pioneer 2250 0 2250 18,000 0 18,000
Subtotal
(%)
5350
(1.32)
42,800
(0.53)
Composite
Arjuna Bisi 8595 5290 13885 64,250 37,450 101,700
Surya 400 450 850 2,950 3,300 6,250
Subtotal
(%)
14735
(3.65)
107,950
(1.34)
Hybrid
Bisi 81210 15205 96415 1,575,215 307,330 1,882,545
Cargill 91730 29190 120920 1,752,120 543,552.5 22,95,672.5
Pioneer 131597 35181 166778 2,872,193 851,498.5 3,723,691.5
Subtotal
(%)
384113
(95.03)
7,901,909
(98.13)
Total
(%)
318882
(78.89)
85316
(21.11)
404198
(100.00)
6,309,528
(78.35)
1,743,131
(21.65)
8,052,659
(100.00)
Note: The existing exchange rate was U.S. $ 1 to Rp 9,000
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Degree of Buyer and Seller Concentration
Cumulative ratio of volumes of sales for the producers was measured 
using CR4. The degree of buyer and seller concentration for the traders was 
estimated using CR4, Hirchman-Herfindahl Index, Entropy Index, and Gini 
Coefficient.
In 2001, the corn seed market in Indonesia was dominated by Global-1 
and Clobal-2 with sales volumes of 4,000 tons (49.8%) and 3,000 tons (37.3%), 
respectively. Thus, both multinational producers acquired 87 percent of the 
national corn seed market share. Global-3 and Local-1 each had market shares 
of 6.2 and 4.2 percent, respectively (Table 2). Concentration Ratio of the four 
largest firms revealed an oligopolistic corn seed market in the country (CR4 =
98%). 
Table 2. Cumulative Ratio of Volume of Sales of Corn Seed Producers at the National 
Level, 2001
Seed Producer Volume of Sales 
(tons)
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative Ratio 
(%)
Global-1 4000 49.8 49.8
Global-2 3000 37.3 87.1
Global-3 500 6.2 93.3
Domestic-1 340 4.2 97.6
Domestic-4 90 1.1 98.7
Domestic-2 40 0.5 99.2
Domestic-3 40 0.5 99.7
Domestic-5 25 0.3 100.0
Total 8035 100.0
In 2001, Global-2 held 52.7 percent (1,160 tons) of the market in East 
Java while Global-1 followed with 34.1 percent (750 tons). Global-3 and 
Domestic-1 with respective markets shares of 9.1 and 1.7 percent (Table 3), 
ranked third and fourth, respectively. CR4 of the producers in this province was 
97.5 percent which showed that the corn seed market was highly oligopolistic. 
Estimated demand for corn seed all over the country in 2001 was 4,962 tons and 
in East Java province in the same year was 4,203 tons (Ditjen Tanaman 
Pangan, 2002). 
All corn seed producers tried to get as much market share as possible in 
East Java because this province was the largest corn producing area in the 
country.  The overall production of these producers could only supply some of 
the demand for corn seeds in East Java. The hybrid corn seeds produced by 
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both multinational and local producers could satisfy only 43 percent of the 
demand.   The remaining demand was filled in by the illegal seeds and second 
generation (F2) seeds. On the other hand, the composite corn seed sold by 
these producers satisfied only 2 percent of potential demand. Most farmers used 
corn seeds produced from their own farms because the composite corn seeds 
still produced good yields up to several generations.
Table 3. Cumulative Ratio of Volume of Sales of Corn Seed Producer in East Java, 2001
Seed Producer Volume of Sales 
(tons)
Percentage (%) Cumulative Ratio 
(%)
Global-2 1160 52.7   52.7
Global-1   750 34.1   86.7
Global-3   200    9.1   95.8
Domestic-1    37    1.7   97.5
Domestic-4    30    1.4   98.9
Domestic-2    12    0.5   99.4
Domestic-3    12    0.5   99.9
Domestic-5      1    0.0 100.0
Total 2202 100.0
  
In East Java province, the market share of Global-2’s hybrid corn seed 
in 2001 was 1,160 tons which shrank to 625 tons in 2002. Global-1’s volume of 
sales also declined from 750 tons to 600 tons during the same period. However, 
Global-3 was able to expand its volume of sales from 200 tons to 400 tons 
(Table 4). In 2000, Global-3 started marketing its C-5 and C-7 seed products  
but the data on volume of sales cannot be precisely determined because most of 
the seed traders selling those corn seed, especially in the area of study, did not 
pay their credit to the producer.
Table 4. Volume of Corn Seed Sales of Multinational Companies in East Java,  2001-
2002 
Market Share (tons)
Year
Global-2 Global-1 Global-3 
2001 1,160 750 200
2002* 625 600 400
Note: *) Up to June 2002
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Up to June 2002, the corn seeds sold by Global-1 at national level 
reached 2,200 tons with a  value of around Rp 33 billions (US $ 3.67 millions). 
The volume of sales of Global-1 consisted of the hybrid corn seed varieties BISI-
2 and BISI-5, which accounted for 60 percent.  The CPI-2 hybrid accounted for 
30 percent and the rest (10 %) was for the sales volume of composite the 
varieties Arjuna BISI and Surya.  The sweet corn seed varieties, F1 BISI Sweet 
and Super Sweet, were sold with smaller volumes of sales.  
Global-1’s corn seed production area in 2001 was around 4,500 hectares. 
The farmlands were owned by the farmers who had contract agreements with 
Global-1. The area owned by Global-1 was less than 7 hectares and was used 
for research purpose located near the processing plant in Kediri regency, East 
Java.
Global-2 also had a similar sales pattern of 40 percent at national level 
while 30 percent of its sales in East Java was sold to government projects. 
Global-3 also sold some of its corn seed products to the government agencies. 
In  2001, Global-2 produced around 6,300 tons of corn seeds from its processing 
plants in Kabanjahe (North Sumatera) and Malang 2 (East Java). The plants 
have respective capacities of 7,000 and 3,000 tons per year. However, the 
processing plant at Malang 1, East Java province, was deactivated after since 
opening of the Malang 2 processing plant. This company had no farmland of its 
own to produce corn seeds. The parent seeds were imported from India and the 
Philippines, where its holding company operated research centers. The 
company claimed that it could satisfy around 55 percent of market demand. The 
actual market share, however, was only less than 50 percent. 
The volume of sales of Global-2 in East Java tended to decline. Until 
June 2002, its volume of sales reached only 625 tons in the same province due 
to the tight competition from the new comer Global-3, and an established 
company Global-1. On the other hand, Global-2 had to export some of its unsold 
products.  In 2001, the company exported 5,000 tons of corn seed to Japan, 
Thailand, Philippines, and Pakistan (Kompas, 2001).
Besides producing hybrid and composite corn seed, Global-1 also 
generated hybrid rice seed, vegetable seed, and fruit seed. Of the total sales 
value, corn seed accounts for 45 percent; vegetable and fruit seed, 40 percent 
and; the remaining 15 percent came from the sales of pesticides, fertilizers, and 
agricultural equipment. All of the seed produced by Global-1 were sold by its 
marketing company with the brand names of Cap Kapal Terbang (Aircraft 
Brand). Many corn seed varieties had been propagated, but only some of them 
are sold in the market.
In 1983, Global-1 started producing the hybrid corn variety, CPI-1, and 
in 1992, it released CPI-2. Later, the company produced other corn seed 
varieties, the BISI-1and BISI-2 in 1995.  In 2001, it produced the BISI-15 variety 
(Table 5). Among global-1’s hybrid corn lines, the varieties most preferred by 
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consumers were BISI-2, BISI-5, and CPI-2. Two varieties of sweet corn seed, 
namely the F1 BISI Sweet and Super Sweet Corn, were also produced by this 
company. Most of sweet corn seed were sold in the temperate areas where 
those varieties are adapted. Composite corn seed varieties sold were Surya and 
Arjuna BISI. The Arjuna variety was propagated by Global-1 and released in 
1996.  It was a composite corn seed generated by the breeders at the AARD but 
was produced and sold by Global-1.  
Global-2 had already released 19 hybrid corn varieties in Indonesia, but 
only 13 varieties marketed subject to consumers’ acceptance. The first corn 
seed variety released by this company in 1985 was Pioneer-1 (P-1) and was 
followed by another variety in 1986, namely P-2. Both corn seed varieties were 
marketed by a domestic marketing company (PT GSMA).  A new variety, i.e. P-
3, was released in 1992 and the latest was P-19. 
Global-3 produced hybrid corn seed with the brand name C. The 
company had released 10 varieties of hybrid corn seed, namely C-1 in 1983 until 
C-10 in 2001. Both C-1 and C-3 seed varieties were produced and marketed by 
Domestic-1. Starting in 2000, Global-3, through its marketing company (PT BS), 
distributed C-5 and C-7 varieties. In 2000, this company initially imported 440 
tons of C-5 and 500 tons of C-7 hybrid corn seed from India. Currently PT BS 
marketed its C-9 corn seed variety in Sumatra Island. All corn varieties released 
by Global-3 are presented in Table 5. Along with the import of hybrid corn seeds, 
Global-3 also imported company parent seed from Thailand and the Philippines 
for propagation in Indonesia. In 2000, Global-3 imported 300 tons of parent 
material corn seeds. In 2001, the company collaborated with 7 farmers’ groups 
of 70 members to produce corn seeds in an area covering 60 ha in the Klaten 
regency, Central Java province. 
Besides producing hybrid and composite corn seed varieties, Domestic-
1 also produced sweet corn. The hybrid corn seed varieties produced were C-1, 
C-3, Semar-2 (S-2), and Semar-3 (S-3). Both C1 and C3 were corn seed 
varieties generated by Global-3.  On the other hand, the S-2 and S-3 were 
varieties invented by the Agency for Agricultural Research and Development 
(AARD).  
AARD developed two composite corn seed varieties, i.e., Arjuna and 
Bisma.  From 1995 to 1999, most of corn seeds produced and sold by Domestic-
1 were hybrid varieties. The ratio changed in 2000 to 2001 when the company’s 
volume of sales included composite corn varieties. Until 2001, Domestic-1 
marketed C-1 and C-2 hybrid corn seed varieties. During the fourth quarter of 
2002, this company sold the SHS-1 and SHS-2, both hybrid seeds. Both SHS-1 
and SHS-2 varieties were developed by Syngenta Thailand and Domestic-1 has 
the rights to produce and market them in Indonesia. Syngenta Thailand is a 
company formed from the merger of Novartis and Seneca (PT Sang Hyang Seri, 
2002). 
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Domestic-1 also produces and sells the hybrid corn seed varieties 
invented by Asian Hybrid Seed Technologies, Inc. (AHST), a company based in 
Davao, the Philippines (Department of Trade and Industry Philippines, 2002). 
Their corn seed varieties were named Jaya-1, Jaya-2, Jaya-3, and NKRI. 
The corn seed produced by Domestic-2 was a composite or open 
pollinated variety (OPV), named Bisma. It purchased the corn stock seed from 
the BBI (Main Seed Farm) in Malang, East Java. During its last season in 2001, 
the company produced 48 tons of Bisma corn seed with a market value of Rp 
144 million or around U.S. $ 16,000. The corn seed production area of the 
company belonged to the contract growing farmers. The company could satisfy 
all of the market demand because it produced corn seed that supplied the 
requirement of government projects which absorbed 90 percent of its production.  
The remaining 10 percent was sold in the free market. In 1998, the company 
produced 150 tons of Bisma corn seed but 5 tons of the total corn seed 
production was unsold.  In 1999, the company produced 70 tons of the 
composite corn seed variety. On the subsequent year, it produced only 25 tons 
but again increased to 40 tons in 2001 (Table 5). 
Table 5. Corn Seed Production of Local Producers in East Java, Indonesia, 1999-2001 
(tons)
Year Domestic-2 Domestic-3 Domestic-4 
1998 150 150 200
1999 70 150 200
2000 25 40 60
2001 40 40 90
2002 40 40 60
Besides producing Bisma corn seed, Domestic-2 formerly produced the 
S-2 hybrid corn seed varieties since 1998 and the S-3 since 1999. The parent 
materials were acquired from the Research Institute for Beans and Tuber Crops 
(Balitkabi) in Malang. Due to the poor performance of the S-2 and S-3 varieties 
brought about by poor corn seed processing, the corn growing farmers avoided 
using both hybrid varieties. Since 2000, the company has stopped producing 
them and at present, this producer propagates the Bisma corn seed. 
For the last three years the corn seed production of Domestic-3 
decreased to around 30 to 40 tons per year, compared with the  previous years, 
i.e., 1997-1999, when production reached 100 to 200 tons per year. The decline 
was due to the lack of government projects for food crop production 
development. The company sold its corn production mainly in East Kalimantan 
province (80 %) and the rest was marketed in Java Island.
The corn seed currently produced by Domestic-4 was a composite 
variety of Bisma. In 2000, the company produced two tons of S-2 hybrid corn 
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seed variety.  In 2001, it produced 90 tons of the Bisma variety and 60 tons of 
the same variety in 2002. The company has 20 hectares of corn seed growing 
areas owned by the producer’s family. Its production could supply at least 90 
percent of market demand. The rest was bought from other producers at a price 
of Rp 2,900/kg with its selling price of Rp 3,000/kg.  
Domestic-5 produced two hundred tons of  A4 hybrid corn seed in Solok 
Regency, West Sumatra Province. All of the corn seed growing and processing 
activities were supervised by the Food Crops and Horticulture Seed Control and 
Certification Service (SCCS) Region V Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatera. 
CR4 of the wholesaler-retailers was 50 percent (Table 6). On the other 
hand, CR4 of retailers was 35 percents.  This showed that corn seed market at 
the wholesaler-retailers’ level in the province was oligopolistic because the CR4
value was greater than the threshold for relatively competitive market of 40 
percent (Parker and Connor, 1979). Conversely, the corn seed retailers were 
relatively competitive as shown by their CR4 that was lower than 40 percent. 
This was because several of the wholesaler-retailers were also the distributors 
of Global-1, Global-2, and Global-3. The first three wholesaler-retailers sold 42 
percent of overall volume of sales, while, the four biggest retailers’ volume of 
sales accounted for only 35 percent.
Table 6. Concentration Ratio of The Four Biggest Firms, Hirchman-Herfindahl Index, 
Entropy Index, and Gini Index of Corn Seed Sales in East Java, 2002
Parameter
Wholesaler-Retailer 
(n=32)
Retailer
(n=75)
CR4  (%) 50.27 34.85
Hirchman-Herfindahl Index 0.086 0.046
Entropy Index 1.227 1.538
Gini Index 0.536 0.586
Hirchman-Herfindahl Index of the wholesaler-retailers was 0.09 and that 
of the retailers was 0.46.  An index closer to the value of 0 indicates that the 
traders are more equal in their volumes of sales. The bigger the index or the 
closer it is to 1, the more unequal the traders will be. The indices showed that 
the retailers were relatively more unequal in volumes of sales than the 
wholesaler-retailers. 
Wholesaler-retailers and the retailers had Entropy Indices of 1.23 and 
1.54, respectively. The closer the index to the logarithm of the sales volume, the 
more equal the traders are. The indices indicated that both wholesaler-retailers 
and retailers were almost equally comparable, but the EI of the retailers was 
closer to the logarithmic value of volume of sales.
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Gini Indices of the wholesaler-retailers and the retailers were 0.54 and 
0.59, respectively. A Gini Index of more than 0.4 revealed that both wholesaler-
retailers and retailers did not have equal market shares. 
Product Differentiation
Global-1 differentiated corn seed through differences in varieties. On the 
other hand, the consumers differentiated corn seeds the through labels and 
packaging. Modern facilities owned by the company, such as laboratories, 
enabled Global-1 to differentiate their corn seed varieties not only physically but 
also genetically. Global-2 could differentiate corn seed not only through varieties 
and its field performance, but also its genetic character. On the other hand, the 
consumers usually distinguished corn seed through seed label and packaging.  
The firm’s product differentiation activities were facilitated by its genetic purity 
test laboratory for corn seed variety in Pandorf, Austria (PT DI, 2001). 
Domestic-1 implemented product differentiation through differences in 
varieties, packaging, label, and price. The farmers distinguished corn seed 
through varieties, and price. Furthermore, the farmers differentiated corn seed 
through the actual performance based on its productivity and resistance to pest 
and disease. Domestic-2, Domestic-3, and Domestic-4 could differentiate corn 
seed through the types of variety using genetic engineering technology. On the 
other hand, consumers distinguish corn seed using visible characteristics like 
the length of grain, labels and packaging. The producers had capability to 
distinguish corn seed by type of variety and the genetic technology used 
because of his long experience in producing corn seed. 
In general, wholesaler-retailers differentiated corn seed products based 
on their varieties through various indicators. The prominent indicators included 
the seed type, product packaging, label, and seed weight. The retailers 
distinguished corn seeds based on the packaging, seed type, and label. All 
commercial seeds in the market were packed in plastic bags with brands, 
company logos, name of variety, and the seed labels on the outer plastic bags. 
Thus, the easiest way to recognize the corn seed products was through external 
appearance of the plastic bag. 
Consumers at the wholesaler-retailers’ and retailers’ levels distinguished 
the corn seed products through the packaging and label. Consumers also used 
grain length and weight as additional indicators. Very few consumers knew the 
product based on its harvest period. The traders and the buyers were not 
allowed to open the plastic bag if they had not yet paid for the corn seed. When 
the plastic bags have been opened, the producers would not replace them with 
the new seeds especially when the validity of label has already expired. The 
seed type and its weight would be recognizable if the plastic bag was open. To 
some extent, the traders or retailers have difficulty in distinguishing varieties with 
the same brand. For example, the Pioneer corn seed varieties look identical in 
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their outer appearances. In a similar manner, the illegal seeds, which are sold 
without any standard packaging nor any indication as to the variety, depends on 
the supplier informing the traders, who, in turn would have to inform the 
consumers what variety of illegal seed they are selling.
Market Knowledge
Seed companies in Indonesia periodically updated themselves on the 
reactions and preferences of the target markets through various means of 
feedback mechanisms in order to either maintain or increase their individual 
market shares. 
Global-1 assessed consumers’ tastes and preferences for corn varieties 
through market research. This firm fields salespersons whose jobs included 
selling the corn seed products and providing information to their company about 
consumers’ opinions or complaints on their product lines, based on informal 
reports from the traders and the mass media.  To some extent, this information 
was one-sided as they only described the farmers’ views on the corn seed 
products sold in the market. In order to reach a greater number of consumers, 
the company employed various information campaign strategies, which include 
field demonstration and trials for their corn seeds.  This function was performed 
by the field extension workers who coordinate with the agricultural service 
offices at the regency and provincial levels to put up demonstration plots. On the 
other hand, top company officials regularly attended scientific meetings 
sponsored by government and non-government organizations, to participate in 
strategy formulation or to discuss recent developments in corn production.
Market research was likewise conducted by Global-2 to assess 
consumers’ preferences on corn seed products.  Their salespersons gathered 
information on specific characteristics of corn seed preferred by consumers and 
the weaknesses of their own product. Information was also gathered on policies 
affecting corn production in the country, particularly the government’s stance on 
the recent hybrid corn production technique like the genetically modified 
organisms (GMO). Company officials were expected to be proactive and to 
attend seminars on developments in the domestic corn agribusiness sector.
Domestic-1 appraised consumers’ demand through information received 
from the traders. However, the company spends more time to lobby with officials 
who could influence the government’s procurement of corn seeds rather than on 
farmers’ preference. Most of the corn seeds produced by the company are sold 
to government projects. Thus, the producer does not have field extension 
workers or salespersons to gather consumers’ preference on its products and 
both the corn seed traders and farmers could not complain directly to the seed 
producer.
Similarly, other producers used their contracts with government 
agencies to determine the volume of their corn seed production of specific 
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varieties.  Information on the market demand was acquired by lobbying with the 
Agricultural Service officials either at the provincial or regency levels. Producers 
were proactive in pursuing purchase orders either directly from the buyers or 
indirectly through brokers. 
Some local producers used the previous season’s sale to estimate their 
sales volume for the next season. For example, government projects for the 
planting of corn on irrigated farmlands were usually implemented during the dry 
season and the same projects for dry land are carried out on wet seasons. Seed 
producers maintained good relationships with corn seed distributors as an 
important way to distribute their production. 
All corn seed traders tried to sell corn varieties based on the level of 
demand they deduced from the market. Several factors that affected demand 
were used as bases for demand assessment by both wholesaler-retailers and 
retailers. The traders also observed the corn varieties that are extensively grown 
in the corn growing areas.  Another method employed was gathering information 
from other corn seed traders and from the seed companies. As a matter of 
policy, the seed companies do not provide information directly to the traders but 
through their sales people. It was observed that no single variety could perform 
well in all regencies or sub regencies due to differences in agro-ecosystem. 
Thus, a popular variety in a particular area might not be as favorably accepted in 
the other areas. 
Information from government institutions like the Agricultural Services, 
was rarely available except to the traders who directly supplied them the corn 
seed for government projects. The farmers had the freedom to choose the 
variety of corn that they desired. Recommendations from government agencies 
did not specifically endorse any particular brand of corn seed.
Barriers to Entry and Exit
Barriers to entry between the multinational and local firms could be 
gleaned in terms of the production cost, selling price, profit and yield of corn 
seed (Table 7). Multinational firms produced mainly the hybrid varieties 
compared to the local firms who produced the composite varieties. Average 
production costs of multinational companies were greater (Rp 6,200/kg) than the 
local firms (Rp 2,160/kg), although in certain instances, the average yield 
obtained by the multinational companies were lower (3.2 tons/ha) than what the 
local firms obtained (4.3 tons/ha).  Nevertheless, the higher selling price of Rp 
19,000/kg for the hybrid varieties compared to Rp 3,400/kg set by the local firms 
for their products, earned for the multinationals higher profits. Domestic-1 
produced the high-yield Semar-3 hybrid corn variety at a lower production cost 
but it got lesser profits due to its lower selling price. The hybrid corn seed 
varieties sold by the multinational firms commanded a higher selling price due to 
its better quality particularly in terms of crop yields.
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Table 7. Barriers to Entry of Corn Seed Producers in East Java, 2002
Producer Variety
Production 
Cost
(Rp/kg)
Selling 
Price 
(Rp/kg)
Profit
(Rp/kg)
Yield 
(tons/ha)
Multinationals
- Global-1 Hybrid1 6,195 18,038 11,843 3.39
- Golbal-2 Hybrid2 6,209 20,000 13,791 3.00
Average Hybrid 6,202 19,019 12,817 3.19
Local firms
- Domestic-1 Composite3 3,044 4,500 1,456 3.36
- Domestic-2 Composite3 1,787 3,000 1,213 5.00
- Domestic-3 Composite3 1,965 3,375 1,410 4.00
- Domestic-4 Composite3 1,860 2,750 890 5.00
Average Composite 2,164 3,406 1,242 4.34
Local firms
- Domestic-1 Hybrid4 4,392 8,000 3,608 4.20
Notes: 1) BISI varieties, 2) Pioneer varieties, 3) Bisma variety, 4) Semar-3 variety 
          The existing exchange rate was US $ 1 to Rp 9,000
The main barrier to entry into the corn seed industry faced by Global-1 
was its high capital requirement.  Other barriers included the ability of the firm to 
conduct market research and to recruit capable breeders. Consequently, the 
large capital investment becomes the main barrier to exit from the corn seed 
industry. Investments included experiment stations, seed processing plants, 
establishment of the marketing company, and all other expenses incurred in 
generating new varieties.  Nonetheless, this company gained a significant 
portion of the market share since it started to launch hybrid corn varieties in the 
early 1980s, namely, the CPI-1 and CPI-2
The main barrier to entry into the corn seed industry encountered by 
Global-2 was the large capital requirement needed to develop its human 
resource for its breeding program, seed production, and marketing activities. 
Similarly, the main barrier to exit from the industry was the large capital invested 
and the potential profits to be earned from the industry. 
Domestic-1’s barrier to entry into this industry was the large amount of 
capital to recruit qualified breeders. So far, this company only produced and sold 
corn seeds but had never introduced new varieties. The company was reluctant 
to exit the seed industry as it has an established market and expected high 
profit. However, despite its captive market and frequent government capital 
infusion, Domestic-1 always incurred losses annually.
The main constraint encountered by Domestic-2 and Domestic-3 to 
enter the corn seed business was the large capital requirement, either the cash 
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for the purchase of variable inputs or for its fixed assets such as vehicles, 
warehouses and processing facilities. Knowledge of the industry and experience 
in seed processing were other constraints.  Knowledge is acquired over time 
from its experiences which included trials and errors. To exit from this industry, 
the producer had to deal with the main constraint posed by its large investment 
in the business coupled with its reluctance to give up its share of the lucrative 
seed corn market.
A major barrier to entry faced by Domestic-4 into the corn seed industry 
was the declining demand for seed corn over the last years due to the 
decentralization program initiated in Indonesia since 2000. This devolved the 
powers of the central government to local government units and fragmented the 
solid market for government purchases of seed corn as the projects had to be 
financed by the local governments. Unfortunately, the financial capabilities of the 
local governments were relatively weaker compared to that of central 
government.  The continuing demand for corn seed serves as the main barrier to 
exit from this industry and indicated that the producer was still able to earn 
profits from producing corn seed.
As in most markets, barriers existed for new investors intending to sell 
commercial corn seed. The biggest being the high amount of capital required to 
start the business. Start-up business needs investment for the stores or kiosks 
and costs of seed purchase. Furthermore, it was difficult to carry a single brand 
of corn seed. Most corn seed traders sold other agricultural inputs, such as 
fertilizers and pesticides. Thus, the new entrant would need additional capital to 
purchase other products for sale. While the growing demand for commercial 
corn seed will attract many new entrants, the stiff competition in the market and 
the additional number of sellers would mean declining profits over time. The 
incoming entrants could also mean stagnant sales for some established traders. 
Due to the number of sellers who would vie for the loyalty of consumers through 
varied means, it would not be easy for new traders to convince consumers to 
shift their allegiance.
There were many factors that affected their economies of scale. Among 
these were the volume of sales, total marketing cost, average marketing cost, 
and investment level (Table 8). On average, the volume of sales of the 
wholesaler-retailers (47.3 tons) was significantly greater than that of the retailers 
(5.3 tons). Consequently, the total marketing costs of the wholesaler-retailers 
was also higher compared to that of the retailers because 99 % of the marketing 
costs consisted of the purchase value for corn. Accordingly, the higher sales 
volume of the wholesaler-retailers led to lower average marketing cost. On the 
other hand, to start their business the wholesaler-retailers had to invest more 
capital than the retailers. 
Increasing demand and huge profits were among the reasons for both 
the retailers and the wholesaler-retailers to stay in the corn seed business. This 
implies that most of the wholesaler-retailers can improve their market share 
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overtime, besides few of them mentioned constant demand.  Furthermore, some 
wholesaler-retailers could avail of credit from corn producers without collateral. 
The large investment also deterred traders from exiting the industry. The
continuous demand and expectation of huge profits were significant barriers for 
retailers to exit this business. Besides, the corn seed business was an income 
generating activity for some retailers who have other sources of income.  
Table 8. Factors Affecting Economies of Scale of Wholesaler-Retailers and Retailers
Engaged in Corn Seed Trading in East Java, 2002 
Item
Wholesaler-
Retailers
(n=32)
Retailers 
(n=75) Difference
Volume of sales (kg) 47,303 5,314 41,989 ***
Total marketing costs (Rp) 868,299,489 100,924,055 767,375,433 ***
Average marketing cost (Rp/kg) 18,356 18,992 -636 **
Investment (Rp/trader) 184,952,094 33,392,840 151,559,254 ***
Minimal investment (Rp) 15,415,000 515,000
Maximal investment (Rp) 908,000,000 184,800,000
Note: ***, **, * are significantly different at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively
          The existing exchange rate was U.S. $ 1 to Rp 9,000
CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions
The market structure of this industry at the producers’ level was highly 
oligopolistic, where the multinational companies dominated the market share. 
Two major corn seed varieties were sold, namely, hybrid and composite 
varieties. Hybrid varieties were more popular than the composites due to their 
higher yields. The local producers could differentiate corn seeds from their outer 
appearances, but the multinationals were also able to differentiate the products 
genetically. All producers were well informed about the market from the 
information they gathered through market research. The large investment was 
the main barrier to entry to the industry. In terms of economies of scale, although 
the multinationals incurred higher average production costs, they could set 
higher selling prices with much greater profits. Meanwhile, established market 
shares and significant profits were the main barriers to exit from the industry.
The market structure of the corn seed industry in East Java province 
was oligopolistic at the wholesaler-retailers’ level and relatively competitive at 
the retailers’ level. Differentiation of corn seeds was carried out by both the 
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traders and the buyers through their packaging and seed labels. The traders 
were well informed about their market from the knowledge they acquired from 
the producers and the other traders. The capital requirement was a major barrier 
to entry to the corn seed business and established market share was the main 
barrier to exit. Higher investment enabled the wholesaler-retailers to purchase 
more volume of sales and lower their average marketing cost per kg.  
Some of the wholesaler-retailers were selling corn seed commodities 
along with other agricultural inputs. Some wholesaler-retailers marketed their 
corn seeds and agricultural inputs to government projects by lobbying with its 
officials. This method of sales was less profitable than selling directly to common 
buyers due to relatively higher transaction costs and delayed payments.
Policy Implications
The price of hybrid corn seeds tended to increase over time due to the 
relatively oligopolistic nature of the market at the producers’ level. The 
government could not intervene in the industry because it does not provide 
subsidy to the multinational companies. The hybrid corn seed industry tends to 
become oligopolistic due to the ability of the multinational firms to control the 
technology and the germplasm for seed propagation, deterring the entry of new 
firms. The local companies cannot cope up with the competition from the 
multinational companies due to lack of budget and innovations especially in 
research and development. The government has to encourage new companies 
into the industry in order to lessen monopolistic power in the market. It will make 
improved varieties of corn more affordable to the farmers. Thus, it will encourage 
the farmers to adopt improved varieties of corn. In addition, it would be better for 
the AARD to assign exclusive rights of the corn varieties it invents to the seed 
producers in order to promote and market the corn seed varieties, subject to 
certain royalties.
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